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 Chapter 1 
 INTRODUCTION 
 Pay attention to matters of importance. 
 —Diogenes Laërtius,  The Life of Solon 
 Habitual inattention must be reckoned the great vice of 
the democratic spirit. 
 —Alexis de Tocqueville,  Democracy in America 
 T HIS BOOK ABOUT what Americans do and think begins by ana-lyzing how we talk and write. The premise is that language mat-ters; our choice of words may refl ect or even affect our frames of 
mind. To borrow from Max Weber, humans are “suspended in webs of 
signifi cance that [we ourselves have] spun,” ensnared in the logic that our 
choice of words dictates. 1 Such is the case with civic engagement. Born of 
a movement to analyze, promote, and possibly save democracy, nurtured 
with the best of intentions, the term  civic engagement has grown out of 
control and has outlived its purpose, sowing more confusion than clar-
ity. However, this book not only exposes the confusion but also turns it 
to our advantage. Acknowledging the problems with civic engagement 
terminology prompts us to examine it more closely, and a closer look can 
yield fresh insight into the unarticulated values and anxieties that have 
contributed to the term’s popularity. Through that exercise we can rec-
ognize more clearly the resources—especially attention and energy—that 
frequently fl ee from the public sphere and civil society but that must be 
protected and promoted for democracy’s sake. Thus we can learn from 
civic engagement even as we bid it goodbye. 
 Indeed, civic engagement as we know it is ready for retirement. That 
judgment might surprise the scholars, journalists, educators, and commu-
nity leaders for whom civic engagement has become a household word. 
Since Robert Putnam fi rst popularized the term in his 1993 political sci-
ence classic,  Making Democracy Work , it has spread through the pages of 
newspapers, Internet sites, academic books and journals, and mainstream 
 1 Clifford Geertz attributed this widely cited line of thinking to Weber. Geertz interprets 
the self-spun web to denote culture, but language and rhetoric fi t the metaphor just as aptly. 
Geertz (1973: 5). 
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 2 Among political theorists see, for example, Barber (1984 and 1998); Cohen and Arato 
(1992); Sandel (1996); Fishkin (1997); and Gastil and Levine (2005). Among political sci-
entists see Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti (1993); Putnam (2000); and Skocpol and Fiorina 
(1999). Among sociologists and historians see Oldenburg (2001) and Ehrenhalt (1995). 
 3 In January of 2002 an Internet search for the term  civic engagement using the Google search 
engine returned approximately 15,000 results. By January of 2011 the number exceeded 3.9 
million. 
 4 Putnam (1995: 65–78); Schudson (1996: 17–27); Ladd (1999a); Barber (1998: 47–53). 
 5 Connolly (2006); Tillotson (2006); McGann and Johnstone (2006). 
 6 See, for example, Schudson (1998) and Ladd (1999a)  for arguments that civic engage-
ment has not declined but has been overlooked and misidentifi ed. 
 7 As one among many examples of tremendously broad endorsements: “Civic engage-
ment is one of the most important instruments in democracy.” Maiello, Oser, and Bieder-
mann (2003: 384). 
political discourse. 2 Politicians praise it; foundations fund its study and 
implementation; educational institutions encourage their students to un-
dertake it. 3 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) promote it in de-
veloping democracies. But like other buzzwords civic engagement means 
so many things to so many people that it clarifi es almost nothing. Thus I 
come to bury civic engagement, not to praise it. 
 Scholars use civic engagement to describe activities ranging from 
bowling in leagues to watching political television shows, writing checks 
to political advocacy groups, and participating in political rallies and 
marches. 4 For many journalists, public offi cials, and political activists 
civic engagement can mean everything from charitable giving to associa-
tional membership, political participation, artistic expression, or com-
munity service. 5 Some maintain that civic engagement has declined in 
the United States and other liberal democracies over the past forty years. 
Others disagree, contending that civic engagement has simply changed its 
shapes and forms. 6 We cannot easily judge these disputes because their 
advocates employ such disparate standards, using civic engagement to 
describe entirely different things. The confl icting parties do agree on one 
point: whatever civic engagement is, we need as much as we can get. 7 But 
they are confused about its meaning and wrong about its value. 
 To be clear, no particular individual or group bears the blame for our 
terminological confusion. Despite the best of intentions we have inadver-
tently fallen into a linguistic trap by choosing fl exible, broad terminology. 
Different thinkers have stretched the popular terms in their own desired 
directions, none of them violating rules of logic or grammar in the pro-
cess. But the result has been many concerned friends of democracy talk-
ing past one another. Rather than blame those who have been trapped 
by civic engagement—which means all of us involved with its study and 
scholarship—we should disarm the trap and start afresh. 
 In that spirit this book advocates the end of civic engagement. Not 
the end of political participation, social connectedness, associational 
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INTRODUCTION  3
 8 Sartori (1970: 1034); Collier and Mahon Jr. (1993: 848). Democracy, for example, con-
notes widely divergent attributes in different scenarios, but scholars continue to use that sin-
gle, stretched concept to describe divergent phenomena, and hence they talk past one another. 
 9 Sartori (1970: 1034). 
 10 Civic. Defi nitions 1a and 2a.  Oxford English Dictionary , 2nd ed., 1989. 
 11 Engagement can also denote an act or a condition, the act of engaging or the condition 
of being engaged. This presents diffi culties for political science and political theory analyses, 
as I will discuss later in this book. 
 12 Throughout this book I use the terms  energy and  activity interchangeably because ac-
tivity is an actualization of our potential energy. They are not perfect synonyms, of course, 
but many other writers—ranging from contemporary scholars to canonical political theo-
rists—use energy in precisely this sense: as an individual power ( dunamis , in Aristotle’s 
membership, voluntarism, community spirit, or cooperative and tolerant 
moral norms but rather the umbrella term,  civic engagement , used to en-
compass all of those topics while clarifying none. Civic engagement as it 
is currently used includes political, social, and moral components, or the 
entire “kitchen sink” of public and private goods. It exemplifi es Giovanni 
Sartori’s concern about “conceptual stretching,” or “the distortion that 
occurs when a concept, applied to new cases, does not fi t the new cases.” 8 
The stakes go beyond mere semantics. Words frame our debates, shape 
our research agendas, and affect the ways in which we view the world. 
When our words yield “vague, amorphous conceptualizations” rather 
than widely accessible concepts—concepts that mean something similar 
for most people most of the time—we cannot easily study, operational-
ize, or discuss the social and political phenomena that surround us. 9 In 
conversations about “making democracy work”—the subject of Putnam’s 
landmark work and also this book’s overarching theme—civic engage-
ment confuses more than it illuminates, and hence it must go. 
 Yet only half of the term merits early retirement. We should put  civic 
to rest while coming to grips with  engagement . Civic simply means that a 
subject pertains to citizenship or a city, so it can easily be subsumed under 
the rubric of  political without any loss of conceptual clarity. 10 In fact, 
clarity prevails when we stop stretching civic to mean sociable, helpful, or 
trusting, as so often happens in civic engagement scholarship. But  engage-
ment possesses untapped potential, and part of my purpose is to tap it. 
Engagement is a uniquely appropriate term for discussing ways of making 
democracy work, but only if we understand its full signifi cance. At present 
we do not. Literally, engagement entails a combination of attention and 
energy (or activity), the two primary components of political governance 
or any intensely interactive relationship. 11 And while civic engagement is 
this book’s nominal subject, attention and energy are its informal stars. 
When we worry about declining engagement, which we have done at in-
creasing rates over the past fi fteen years, we are worrying about the elu-
siveness of our attention and energy—and well we might. 12 Since the era 
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4  CHAPTER 1
 terminology) to be actualized in dynamic activity ( energeia , in Aristotle). Aristotle,  De Ani-
ma (1988: 412a22-8) and  Nicomachean Ethics (1985: 1153a10). 
 13 James (1890: 404). For a more contemporary account see Cohen and Magen (2005). 
 14 The costs to which I refer include the sheer monetary cost of increasing political partic-
ipation among a reluctant citizenry, whether through revitalized citizenship education, paid 
holidays for public deliberation (Ackerman and Fishkin 2004), or other forms of outreach, 
which I discuss in chapter 6. They also include the costs to individual freedom incurred 
by attempts to coerce political engagement through such initiatives as mandatory public 
service or compulsory voting (Lijphart 1997). 
 15 Others have recognized that civic engagement is too broad, and one set of scholars 
takes the promising but incomplete step of distinguishing between  civic and  political en-
gagement. Zukin et al. (2006). However, for reasons discussed below their distinction does 
not resolve the diffi culties it sets out to remedy. 
of ancient Greece, democracies have struggled to maintain these same re-
sources. Attention involves selectively focusing one’s wits on subjects that 
generate special interest or demand redress; activity involves following 
through on the subjects attended to, investing energy in their maintenance 
or resolution. 13 Democracy’s citizens must indeed be engaged, which is 
to say attentive and active. But attentive to what? Active in which ways? 
That vague designation, “civic,” gives us little indication. 
 When sociologists laud civic engagement they commonly mean what I 
call  social or  moral engagement, people’s attention and energies invested 
in social groups and networks or focused on moral reasoning and follow-
through. When political theorists and political scientists laud civic en-
gagement they often focus on what I call  political engagement, people’s 
attention to and activity in political issues and processes. These issues and 
processes require interaction with organs of the polity at any level of gov-
ernment. But democracy may fl ourish with only middling levels of politi-
cal engagement if it is rich in social and moral engagement. That possibil-
ity goes against the belief, common among participatory democrats, that 
we need as much political attention and activity as we can get. Rather 
than disparage political engagement, we should recognize the costs as 
well as the benefi ts of promoting it and should remember that democ-
racy requires a variety of dispositions, values, and behaviors. 14 We should 
be asking which kinds of engagement—political, social, or moral—make 
democracy work, and how they might be promoted. Civic engagement 
(should be) dead; long live political, social, and moral engagement. 15 
 The concern with making democracy work spans the history of politi-
cal theory and political science, from ancient Greece to the present day. 
Aristotle, Rousseau, Madison, and Tocqueville all stress the importance 
of an attentive and energetically active citizenry. But (as I also advocate) 
they distinguish among different kinds of attention and activity; they un-
derstand that not all engagement is political, that social and moral en-
gagement are equally vital to democracy’s health, and that the three may 
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 16 Here I draw upon Weber’s defi nition of the state as “a human community that (success-
fully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory,” 
and politics as “striving to share power or striving to infl uence the distribution of power ei-
ther among states or among groups within a state.” Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in 
Weber (2007: 78). Power itself comprises a controversial subject, but an all-encompassing 
defi nition is not necessary for present purposes. 
 17 These defi nitions raise more questions than they answer; I will address some of the 
relevant questions in chapter 2. 
 18 Social engagement always involves at least some kind of moral engagement, an underly-
ing consciousness of the appropriate norms of behavior. Most political engagement involves 
at least some kind of moral engagement, as well, an underlying consciousness of the appropri-
ate goals to pursue through political action. But my category of moral engagement involves a 
more demanding kind of moral attention and energetic follow-through, in which moral rea-
soning is brought to the forefront. Further, some moral codes and moral reasoning are more 
appropriate for liberal democracies than others. Hitler’s inner circle may have been morally 
engaged but with a kind of moral reasoning incompatible with liberal democracy. 
 19 Arendt (1963). Technically, Arendt’s “thoughtlessness” describes total disengagement 
from moral reasoning. But as noted above, virtually everyone engaged in political or social 
dynamics participates in some moral code and exercises moral agency, although the moral 
stand in tension with one another. Too many present-day scholars, politi-
cians, educators, and community activists ignore this critical approach 
and wrongly assume that participation in political processes and institu-
tions, participation in social dynamics and networks, and participation in 
tolerant, responsible, moral agency always go together—lumped conve-
niently under the umbrella term  civic engagement —and that to promote 
any of them is to promote all three. 
 But in fact they are distinct. Political engagement means activity and 
attention relating to the political processes and political institutions of 
local, regional, or national government. It can include voting, seeking 
or holding public offi ce, attending town hall meetings, circulating a pe-
tition—any engagement whose purpose is to infl uence state actors and 
political outcomes. 16 Social engagement means activity and attention re-
lating to social groups, dynamics, and norms. It can include myriad in-
volvements ranging from Putnam’s bowling leagues to parenting groups 
to friendship circles, all of which are often categorized as civic engage-
ment although they have no obvious connection to citizenship or the 
polis. Moral engagement means attention and activity relating to moral 
reasoning and moral agency. 17 And while these different kinds of engage-
ment can accompany one another—political engagement can involve so-
cial and moral components, for example—they need not do so. 18 
 Political and social engagement can coexist with an absence of moral 
engagement—what the political theorist Hannah Arendt calls “thought-
lessness,” or a failure to “think what we are doing”—as in the cases of 
nationalist extremism, religiously inspired terrorism, and racial suprema-
cists’ hate groups. 19 Conversely, tolerant, charitable, and socially engaged 
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6  CHAPTER 1
codes with which they engage may not be compatible with liberal democracy. Further, Ar-
endt’s activity of “thinking,” a kind of moral reasoning, involves temporary withdrawal 
from the world of action. Chapter 2 of this book discusses these matters further. 
 20 See, for example, Bermeo (2003) and Armony (2004) for detailed chronicles of de-
mocracies or democratizing nations in which high and widespread political engagement 
accompanied instability, violence, and, at times, the end of democracy. 
 21 For an excellent explanation of this core/ideal distinction, applied to liberal virtues, see 
Sabl (2005b: 207–35). See also Shklar, “The Liberalism of Fear” in Shklar and Hoffmann 
(1998: 3–21). 
 22 Like Shklar I “begin with what must be avoided,” but I broaden the scope of ills to 
include not only “the worst” but also the very bad. We must avoid totalitarianism, slavery, 
organized cruelty, and constant fear of the preceding—which are awful but not terribly 
likely in most Western democracies—and also radical atomization, enforced marginaliza-
tion, and systematic unfairness (denying certain people or groups a reasonable chance of 
achieving goals their fellow citizens take for granted). The latter type of deprivation pales 
in comparison with the former but would be shunned by any who take liberal democratic 
values seriously. See Allen (2004) for a vivid account of twentieth-century forced marginal-
ization in the southern United States and its incompatibility with democratic ideals. 
 23 Rosenblum (1998b: 48). Robert Dahl posits a similar aim and rationale: “Because it 
is easier to discover ways of reducing inequality than ways of achieving perfect equality 
(whatever that might mean), an advanced democratic country would focus on the reduction 
of the remediable causes of gross political inequalities.” Dahl (1989: 323). 
 24 Martin Krygier proposes “Hobbesian idealism” that begins with the worst but then 
“thinks simultaneously about avoiding evil and about pursuing good; about threat, about 
promise, and about their interplay.” Krygier (2005: 148). 
individuals may eschew political participation but still contribute to de-
mocracy’s success. And very high levels of political engagement, in the ab-
sence of essential democratic ingredients such as responsive political in-
stitutions, can engender violent instability and jeopardize public safety. 20 
Civic engagement enthusiasts often overlook these vital nuances. 
 My goal is to make democracy work better rather than make it work 
ideally. This book inquires into democracy’s core requirements—those 
conditions that it must have (or avoid) in order to work at all—before 
positing its ideal features. 21 Citizens might disagree about the latter be-
cause reasonable people hold divergent ideals, but we can probably agree 
upon the phenomena that make democracy fail: for example, rampant 
lawlessness, weak or unresponsive political institutions, capture of gov-
ernment by unrepresentative factions, or citizens widely unable to com-
municate, cooperate, or compromise. 22 Grounding ourselves in “guarding 
against the worst” lets us ground ourselves with a measure of consensus. 23 
But beginning with the worst does not mean dwelling on it exclusively. It 
leaves ample room for a chastened idealism that strives to achieve not the 
best but a variety of goods—not a single, greatest good that fi ts everyone 
equally but a framework in which individuals and communities can pur-
sue pluralistic goals and values, including the values of individualism and 
communal cohesion. 24 
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INTRODUCTION  7
 25 By granting citizens the freedom to reject the very practices that led to liberalism’s suc-
cess, “liberalism itself . . . bears no small responsibility for the stiff challenge it now faces.” 
Berkowitz (1999: 174). 
 26 Others have argued convincingly that normative theory cannot dispense with empiri-
cal evidence. See, for example, Dennis Thompson (1970). Thompson criticizes the trend 
toward “prescriptivism,” which attempts to construct normative democratic theory without 
input from empirical social science. He also criticizes the opposite extreme, “descriptivism,” 
which assumes that empirical evidence can simply “disprove” any normative claim or ideal. 
My stance resembles Thompson’s. 
 This book advocates clear terms and discourse, and to follow those 
standards I must clarify what I mean by democracy. Just as civic engage-
ment has been stretched to the point where it means almost anything 
to anyone, so too democracy carries numerous connotations. This book 
analyzes engagement in modern, representative democracies as opposed 
to face-to-face direct democracy, possible only in small communities. 
Modern, representative democracies are also liberal democracies, polities 
committed to individual rights and dignity as well as to any perceived 
public good. We must specify liberalism because democracy by itself—
majority rule—can involve illiberal coercion, excessive paternalism, or 
stultifying social conformity unless citizens and offi cials uphold legal and 
constitutional protections vigilantly. Liberal democrats value autonomy 
and choice, but that very autonomy means that citizens may disengage 
politically if they choose. 25 What are the stakes? How should democracy 
respond? 
 Democracy would not be democracy, rule of the people, without at 
least a modicum of political attention and activity from its citizens. But 
beyond the core requirement of avoiding radical disengagement, what 
value does political engagement promise to individuals and communities 
and how much of it does liberal democracy require? Scholars commonly 
assume that we need as much political engagement as we can get, that 
more politically engaged democracies are healthier than others, and that 
modest declines in political engagement should give us cause for grave 
concern. Some of the most common arguments in this vein either disre-
gard empirical evidence or otherwise fail to convince. Political engage-
ment may still hold great value, but we must do a better job of defi ning 
and defending it. 26 
 Viewing political engagement as a combination of attention and en-
ergetic activity helps us to understand its value as well as the reasons 
why democracies often struggle with defi cits. Attention and energy are 
essential to intensive, cooperative undertakings yet are diffi cult to attract 
and sustain. That dilemma gives rise to the other half of this book’s title. 
Some scholars assume that citizens would pay close attention to politics 
were it not for assorted, confounding infl uences—the baffl ing complexity 
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 27 See, for example, Dewey (1935). 
 28 Bellah et al. (1992: 255). 
 29 Not only modern, liberal democracies but also ancient, direct democracies have strug-
gled with this problem. 
 30  Acharnians , in Aristophanes (1927: 19–23). The play dates to 425 BC. 
 31 Hansen (1987: 18). Scholars estimate the average attendance level of an Athenian as-
sembly ( ekklesia ) at between 20 percent and 40 percent of the total citizenry, but some 
interpret this range as indicating fairly high interest in politics given the relative frequency 
of the assemblies (nearly one per week). See Ober (1991: 132). 
 32  Ekklesiazousai , in Aristophanes (1927). The play dates to 392 or 393 BC. “Without 
this stipend, poorer men would have found it hard to leave their regular work to serve in 
these time-consuming positions.” Martin (2000: 113). 
 33 “The poorest of the citizens—the old, handicapped, unlucky and unskilled—might well 
attend the Assembly regularly as a way to collect money not otherwise available to them.” 
Ober (1991: 136). Note that not all citizens who participated were motivated by the money, 
and the stipend may well attest to Athens’s egalitarian commitments rather than a conces-
sion to low attendance. Martin (2000). 
of modern politics or the pressures of time and money, for example. 27 
According to this line of thinking, as the sociologist Robert Bellah has 
written, “democracy means paying attention.” 28 That view is mistaken. 
Democracy means, and in practice has always meant, citizens struggling 
to pay attention and invest energy politically. 29 In other words, to say 
democracy is to say attention  defi cit—at least, a defi cit between theorists’ 
ideals of political attentiveness and activity, and citizens’ actual priori-
ties and practices. Unlike its modern-day association, “attention defi cit 
disorder,” attention defi cit democracy is simply a diagnosis rather than 
a malady. The diagnosis need not be a counsel of despair, but if it goes 
unacknowledged our political theories will be at odds with our choices 
and capacities. 
 Democracy’s attention defi cit is certainly nothing new. Even ancient 
Athens, widely regarded as a paragon of participatory democracy, saw 
its political pretensions skewered by the comic poet Aristophanes: “Here, 
on one of the Assembly days—broad day, too!—not a soul is in place! 
They’re gossiping in the market, shifting here and there to dodge the long 
rope’s red paint smear.” 30 
 Athenians so often preferred gossip to deliberative politics that the 
city’s soldiers employed “red-dyed ropes . . . to chase citizens from the 
Agora [marketplace] towards the half-fi lled assembly.” 31 Being roped 
meant entanglement and also embarrassment; the telltale red stains in-
vited ridicule and a fi ne. In subsequent years Athenians began paying a 
daily stipend for political participation, and in Aristophanes’ later play, 
 Ekklesiazousai , soldiers used the same red-dyed ropes to keep citizens 
out of the overfl owing assembly. 32 That stipend apparently compensated 
for any boredom. 33 But neither scenario—neither the gossiping derelicts 
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 34 Tocqueville (1969: 611). 
 35 Ibid. Dana Villa (2008) has pointed out that Tocqueville did not witness and could not 
fully grasp the possibility of corporate and global capitalism, which may have done more 
toward crowding out the role of citizens than even big government has done. Even with that 
point granted, however, Tocqueville did notice Americans’ frequent inattention to politics, 
especially outside of the tiny New England area that he praised so highly. He also bemoaned 
the increasing infl uence of economic power and commercialism on American culture and 
politics. See Craiutu and Jennings (2004: 398). More on these points in chapter 4. 
 36 Dewey (1935: 90). 
 37 Ibid., 70. 
 38 Lippmann (1925: 21). Although Dewey wrote  Liberalism and Social Action after Lipp-
mann’s  Phantom Public , the quotes presented here are illustrative of the two theorists’ 
long-standing debate. See also Lippmann (1929) and Dewey (1927). 
 39 Lippmann (1925: 127). 
nor the mercenary attendees—suggests the presence of an independently 
attentive demos. 
 More than two thousand years later democracy had changed loca-
tions but not its ability to focus. Alexis de Tocqueville, now widely (but 
wrongly) regarded as an unqualifi ed enthusiast for American civic en-
gagement, observed a potential problem with New World democracy. He 
remarked that the average American citizen “does everything in a hurry 
. . . he hardly has the time, and he soon loses the taste, for going deeply 
into anything.” 34 Absent the distractions of a high-tech environment or 
the pressures of a heavily industrialized economy, Tocqueville still wit-
nessed a “habitual preoccupation” with private affairs that left each in-
dividual “concerned with several aims at the same time.” He considered 
ancient as well as modern democracies and concluded that “habitual in-
attention must be reckoned the great vice of the democratic spirit.” 35 
 In the early twentieth century attention and energy once again took 
center stage in the still-infl uential Dewey-Lippmann debate. American 
philosopher John Dewey argued that universal education, a civically 
educational media, and thoroughgoing economic reform could promote 
awareness of mutual interests, direct attention toward public affairs, 
and “release human energy for pursuit of higher values.” 36 As a result 
“the average individual would rise to undreamed of heights of social and 
political intelligence,” and citizens could collectively direct their govern-
ments and destinies. 37 Public intellectual Walter Lippmann countered 
that modern society presents a baffl ingly complex political environment 
and criticized Dewey for promoting a “myth” of the “omnicompetent 
citizen.” 38 In spite of any educational reforms, most citizens “even if they 
had genius, would give only a little time and attention to public affairs.” 39 
Lippmann proposed much more modest goals for democratic politics, 
offering “a theory which economizes the attention of men as members of 
the public, and . . . confi nes the effort of men, when they are a public, to 
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 40 Ibid., 199. 
 41 The participatory (or deliberative) model insists that for democracy to merit its name, well-
informed citizens must actively participate in political deliberation and decision-making. The 
elite (or pragmatic) model envisions modern politics as the province of well-trained elites who 
are periodically checked by competitive elections. For more on the debate between the partici-
patory and elite models, see Posner (2003). For prominent arguments of the former type, see 
Pateman (1970); Gutmann (1987); Fishkin (1991); and Leib (2005). For prominent arguments 
in the latter group, see Converse (1964); Zaller (1992); Somin (1998); and Caplan (2007). 
 42 Political scientists considering limited attention generally ask whether a politically 
inattentive citizenry can comprise a rational and self-governing public. Converse (1964), 
Somin (1998), and Kuklinski and Quirk (2000) consider evidence to the contrary, whereas 
Popkin (1994) and Lupia and McCubbins (1998) present more optimistic arguments. 
 43 Putnam (1993: 167). 
a part they might fulfi ll.” The appropriate part for citizens would involve 
action “only when there is a crisis of maladjustment,” and even then it 
would simply entail choosing among competing elites. 40 
 Present-day scholars tend to endorse one of these two arguments while 
ignoring the rich terrain in between. To generalize broadly, Dewey has 
won the day in educational studies and political theory and among those 
who advocate a “participatory” model of democracy. Lippmann holds 
more currency among economists, political scientists who study voting 
behavior, and those who advocate an elite model of democracy. 41 In ana-
lyzing what causes political disengagement and whether greater partici-
pation is desirable or possible, I steer a middle course between Dewey’s 
excessive optimism and Lippmann’s undue pessimism, between the par-
ticipatory and elite models of democracy, while confronting similar prob-
lems of limited political attention and energy. 
 To be fair, empirical political scientists have done a better job than 
normative political theorists of acknowledging citizens’ limited politi-
cal attention. But political scientists focus almost exclusively on limited 
attention’s implications for voting behavior and public opinion, which 
constitute only a small bit of what political theorists consider the meat 
of democratic political engagement. 42 This book attempts to combine 
some of each camp’s strengths: a clear-eyed acknowledgment of citizens’ 
limited political attention and the implications for democratic politics, 
extended to include the many varieties of political engagement beyond 
episodic voting and political awareness. 
 Thus far I have focused primarily on attention, but citizens’ energies 
are equally important. Much has been written about democracies’ need 
for so-called social capital, which denotes “features of social organiza-
tion, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the effi ciency 
of society by facilitating coordinated actions.” 43 When we participate in 
voluntary associations and other cooperative endeavors—when we are 
socially engaged—we can develop interpersonal relationships that fa-
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 44 Social capital represents a potentially useful but confusing construct, because it refers 
not only to the norms—such as trust and reciprocity—already present in social organiza-
tions or movements but also to the relationships that people can build when they join social 
organizations or movements. The fi rst kind of social capital helps people to build the second 
kind, but the second kind also helps to build the fi rst kind. Which one comes fi rst? That ques-
tion has been examined in other studies and lies beyond the scope of the present analysis. 
 45 “Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achieve-
ment of certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence. . . . For example, a group 
whose members manifest trustworthiness and place extensive trust in one another will be 
able to accomplish much more than a comparable group lacking that trustworthiness and 
trust. . . . In a farming community . . . where one farmer got his hay baled by another and 
where farm tools are extensively borrowed and lent, the social capital allows each farmer to 
get his work done with less physical capital in the form of tools and equipment.” Coleman, 
 Foundations of Social Theory (1990: 302, 304, 307), cited in Putnam (1993). 
 46 For social psychological research in perceived self-effi cacy and engagement, see Bandura 
(1977 and 1997). For effi cacy and students’ attention and engagement, see Linnenbrink 
and Pintrich (2003). 
cilitate further cooperation. 44 We can draw  upon social capital as well, 
just as we draw upon fi nancial capital, to help us achieve individual or 
collective goals; we can channel social capital into political outlets and 
institutions, thus facilitating specifi cally political goals. 45 But we cannot 
generate social capital in the fi rst place without moving beyond passive 
attention to invest our energies in cooperative endeavors and thus forge 
useful relationships, bonds, and reciprocal norms. 
 I will advance an original argument about the relationship among at-
tention, energy, and citizens’ tastes. Attention generally precedes energetic 
activity; if a topic does not capture our attention it will not enduringly 
attract our energy. So to attract our energy and form social or political 
capital, a subject must fi rst attract and hold our attention. Attention, in 
turn, is shaped by many factors, including ideology, habituation, culture, 
and perceived threats or dangers. But it is also strongly infl uenced by in-
dividual taste, and as the old saying goes there is no accounting for that. 
So to a greater extent than many scholars acknowledge, attention follows 
tastes and energy follows attention. 
 Tastes → Attention → Energy → Social and Political Capital 
 Perceived self-effi cacy—one’s ability to succeed at a given endeavor 
and make a meaningful impact—can also affect tastes and attention, as 
Tocqueville recognized. More on that in chapter 4. 46 We pay attention to 
things that we like, sometimes at the expense of our own long-term inter-
ests. All of us know hobbyists, sports fans, or even video game enthusi-
asts who focus raptly on trivialities (and invest substantial energy) while 
ignoring policy debates that could vitally affect their futures. 
 In other words, having an interest does not always mean taking an in-
terest. Having a stake in an outcome does not mean that we attend to it. 
This content downloaded from 
             130.58.34.221 on Wed, 14 Jul 2021 13:56:27 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
12  CHAPTER 1
 47 “Men may be frustrated in their primary activities [involving work, play, love, family, 
friendship and the like] without ever turning to politics for solutions . . . since the primary 
activities are voracious in their demands for time, political activity must enter into competi-
tion with them. For most people it is evidently a weak competitor.” Dahl (1961: 180). 
 48 Galston (1998: 64). 
 49 Ibid. 
 50 Fishkin (1997); Weeks (2000); Gabardi (2001); Ackerman and Fishkin (2004). 
 51 Sandel (1996); Barber (1998). Not all civic republicans emphasize participation and moral 
deliberation; see, for example, Pettit (1997). Here I am concerned with the more participatory 
version. For more on the varieties of civic republicanism, see Honohan (2002) and Berger (2010). 
 52 Villa (2008: 25) writes that “the only way of combating this bogus inevitability [of 
overreaching, emergency-power governments doing whatever they like] is to reclaim our ca-
pacity for action as citizens, rather than as members of single-issue focused interest groups.” 
Meyers (2008: 264–66) insists that a renewed dedication to active citizenship remains our 
only means of resisting overly ambitious and possibly malicious governments. 
When democratic citizens can do as they like, politics seldom fares well 
in the taste test. Not only now but also in most previous eras political 
affairs have attracted citizens’ enduring attention only when faced with 
few and boring competitors. 47 Nonetheless, understanding our capacities 
and proclivities equips us to think about effective responses to disengage-
ment. That is exactly what this book aims to do: diagnose democracy’s 
tendencies and limitations and then prescribe pragmatic means of mak-
ing democracy work better. 
 Thus the diagnosis of attention defi cit democracy also entails a kind 
of public philosophy, a set of beliefs that “specify general directions for 
public policy within a basic understanding of how the world works.” 48 
In other words, the diagnosis plus the prescriptive directions that follow 
from it—which I will detail in chapter 6—comprise the public philoso-
phy of attention defi cit democracy. Some public philosophies are formu-
lated from the top down, meaning that they are held by politically active 
intellectuals who hope to guide the public’s practices and institutions. 49 
Examples include the worthy political theories of deliberative democracy 
and civic republicanism. Self-described deliberative democrats, giving pri-
ority to political equality and democratic legitimacy, generally insist upon 
widespread participation in deliberative political forums, with procedures 
that prioritize reason over narrow interests and conditions that guarantee 
all an equal voice. 50 Self-described civic republicans, for the sake of mean-
ingful political liberty and self-governance, tend to stress an ideal of ac-
tive citizenship and civic virtue more than reason-based deliberation. They 
insist upon greater citizen control over “the forces that govern our lives” 
and greater participation in timely moral and political debates. 51 Other 
theorists concerned with public freedom exhort citizens to assert them-
selves, exercise their full prerogatives as citizens, and hold governments as 
well as corporations fully accountable for their actions. 52 But as William 
Galston reasonably cautions, “given most Americans’ ambivalence about 
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 53 Galston (1998: 79). Galston here addresses deliberative democracy but his comment 
could just as easily apply to civic republicanism. 
 54 Thompson (1970). 
 55 John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse (2002: 183) fi nd that “in contrast to 
theorists’ speculations,” a vast amount of survey data indicates that “people’s dislike of 
politics runs deep and is unlikely to be eliminated if they would only get involved with other 
people in political procedures.” However, subjects also acknowledged that problems could 
arise from too much disengagement. 
 56 Thompson (1970). 
the place of political activities in their lives, it remains to be seen whether 
ideals of a more engaged and demanding citizenship can gain public 
support and become the basis of an effective new public philosophy.” 53 
Top-down public philosophies can play a valuable role in our political 
discourse, proffering ideals and goals toward which we might strive. As 
political theories they may have much to recommend them; they prescribe 
what Dennis Thompson has called “reconstructive ideals,” without which 
political philosophy would lack imagination or vision. 54 However, such 
reconstructive theories rely upon a majority of citizens adopting practices 
and commitments that most have tended to regard with distaste when re-
garding them at all. So for the foreseeable future these public philosophies 
are far more philosophical than public. 
 Attention defi cit democracy, conversely, points to an accessible public 
philosophy, a set of ideas about the public that is embraced by the pub-
lic as well. 55 It summarizes the belief that marshaling continual, wide-
spread political attention and energy is nearly impossible, but that we 
can and should do more with our collective resources than we have in 
recent years. Rather than implying cynical resignation, attention defi cit 
democracy entails an enlightened and chastened idealism that pragmati-
cally battles democracy’s ever-present tendencies toward privatism. It 
prescribes what Thompson calls “constructive ideals,” or improvements 
that could be implemented without foundationally restructuring soci-
ety or the citizenry. 56 It eschews utopian plans not out of pessimism but 
rather to focus on the concrete steps by which we can fi ght the costs of 
preventable disengagement. 
 A surprising number of canonical political theorists agree with my em-
pirical diagnosis. For example, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Alexis de Tocque-
ville, John Dewey, and Hannah Arendt, all commonly perceived as par-
ticipatory enthusiasts, recognize that free societies will struggle to muster 
and maintain political attention and activity. But they do not develop the 
implications of their observations, so their uneasiness generally goes un-
noticed even by the scholars who celebrate their work. Recovering this 
aspect of our philosophical tradition—philosophers’ underappreciated 
unease about the challenges of sustaining political attention and energetic 
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 57 Nozick (1974: 247). 
 58 Michael Walzer claims that some communitarians “prescribe citizenship as an anti-
dote” to modern isolation and atomization. Walzer (1992: 90). Bellah et al. (1992) and 
Barber (1984) belong to that camp. 
 59 Pateman (1970); Barber (1996); Wolin (2008). Dana Villa acknowledges some self-
incurred aspects of citizen disengagement but places more blame on an arrogant, arrogating 
executive branch for ignoring popular dissent and creating an “atmosphere of generalized 
fear,” as well as the “tyranny of public relations and advertising,” not to mention “robustly 
global competition,” because “far more than government, the marketplace throws us back 
upon ourselves.” Villa (2008: 5–9). 
 60 Bellah et al. (1992: 270). 
 61 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, 43 million Americans (approximately 16 percent of per-
sons one year old and over) changed their residences during the one-year period between March 
of 1999 and March of 2000. Of these 43 million, 39 percent were considered “long distance mov-
activity—helps us to view our current predicament as part of an age-old 
struggle rather than as a new and uniquely frightening development. 
 My empirical diagnosis should prove relevant and useful even to those 
who disagree with my prescriptions. To ignore the diagnosis entirely 
would be to practice what Robert Nozick ironically calls normative soci-
ology, or “the study of what the causes of problems  ought  to be.” 57 Incom-
plete diagnoses invite misleading prescriptions. For example, some social 
and political theorists in the communitarian or civic republican schools la-
ment a perceived decline in political and social engagement and prescribe 
increased political participation to remedy democracy’s alleged malaise. 58 
Some of them blame the impersonal forces of an unfettered free market 
or an unresponsive “big government” for dampening public discourse and 
political engagement. 59 Others criticize an ethos of excessive individual-
ism that undermines our commitments to one another and to the public 
interest. 60 Those diagnoses arise from sound observations and thus have 
struck a responsive note with many citizens. But sometimes they overlook 
equally sound observations that complicate any prescriptive advice. While 
market forces and bureaucratic government may be partly responsible 
for subduing political engagement, we citizens also play a signifi cant role. 
Thus, while I do not deny that global, economic, and governmental forces 
can stifl e political engagement I choose to focus here on voluntary disen-
gagement, not only because others have extensively indicted those larger, 
impersonal forces but also because citizen inattention has plagued democ-
racy for as long as democracies have existed, long predating big business, 
big government, and modern mass media. 
 Indeed, despite our concerns about political and social engagement 
most citizens shrink from changes and commitments that might counter 
the perceived trends. We may value a sense of community, but we also 
value economic opportunity, privacy, and mobility, which helps to ex-
plain why we relocate frequently, spend considerable time alone or with 
intimates, and fi nd it diffi cult to feel rooted in any particular place. 61 We 
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ers,” having changed residence across counties or states. A fairly normal annual relocation rate is 
16 percent; in the mid-1980s as many as 20 percent of Americans moved in a single year. 
 62 According to the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, in late October of 
2000, 97 percent of registered voters said that they planned to vote in the November elections, 
whereas 67.5 percent actually turned out to vote. Voter turnout was substantially higher in 
2004 but still far lower than the level of those who expressed an intention to vote. 
 63 Billig (1995: 64–81; and 1996: 238). As an example of reasonable antinomy, “patience is 
a virtue” and “he who hesitates is lost” each represent sound advice in the appropriate context. 
 64 Habermas (1984a and 1984b). 
rue low rates of voter participation and generally intend to vote, but often 
fail to follow through. 62 We value political participation, but not partici-
pation that is compelled. Cherishing our individualism, we are loath to 
allow our peers, let alone our government, tell us (without invitation) 
how to live, what to think, or how to spend our time. In other words, 
we Americans value community and political engagement but hold other 
values that make them diffi cult to sustain, and we do not want to be 
forced to resolve the discrepancy. Thus we wrestle with political antin-
omy, an opposition between equally reasonable principles. Such tensions 
are neither rare nor incoherent; in almost every society “the themes of 
common sense . . . pull in contrary directions,” and the ensuing struggles 
can elicit fruitful moral debates. 63 Attention defi cit democracy’s diagnosis 
acknowledges the fact of our reasonable antinomies, and its prescriptions 
try to accommodate our confl icting values. 
 This book assumes from the outset that our own choices may lead 
to undesired outcomes. I draw upon classic works of political theory to 
illuminate those outcomes: how they arise, why they are undesirable, 
how bad they are compared with available alternatives, and what can 
we do to effect a change. Our response must be tempered by a sobering 
question. If preservation of democratic freedom is one of our animating 
concerns, can we reverse trends of voluntary disengagement without co-
ercing citizens illiberally and hence compromising the very ideals that we 
had hoped to serve? 
 Jürgen Habermas, articulating a common theme of democratic theory, 
maintains that democracies should establish a public sphere in which all 
citizens can participate equally in rational deliberation, a situation that 
he calls the “ideal speech situation.” 64 Indeed, the public realm could 
and should be more inclusive, welcoming, and fair. Nonetheless, if my 
argument is correct then even Habermas’s “ideal speech situation”—it-
self a distant if not unrealizable goal—might not be enough to counter-
act voluntary political disengagement. That daunting realization should 
not dampen but only redirect our aspirations from an exclusive focus 
on political supply—the opportunities for citizens to engage on equal 
footing—to the less commonly appreciated problem of political demand. 
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 65 Held (1980: 396). 
 66 See, for example, Putnam (1995 and 2000). 
The motivation to engage involves many complex factors, including citi-
zens’ levels of social connectedness, educational attainment, and eco-
nomic status. Providing an “ideal speech situation” without addressing 
widespread defi ciencies in these socioeconomic resources will not yield 
widespread political reengagement, as Habermas acknowledges. 65 But 
wealth and education do not guarantee political engagement, either; 
political attention and energy wander even among the well educated 
and well heeled. 66 The public philosophy of attention defi cit democracy 
focuses on stimulating our demand for political engagement through 
liberal democratic means. 
 Four possibilities for pragmatic reform follow immediately from my 
diagnosis, and I will develop them more fully in later chapters. First, citi-
zens and their representatives can strive to make local and national poli-
tics more appealing to widespread tastes. Second, we can look to habitu-
ation and early education to make our tastes more political. Third, we 
can reform our political institutions so that they channel existing political 
attention and energy more effi ciently. Fourth, we can target the attention 
(and energy) of constituencies most prone to disengagement. Aside from 
working with tastes, we can strive to make political institutions more 
welcoming—to give citizens a meaningful sense of political effi cacy. That 
aspiration points us toward local political institutions and engagement, 
where any individual citizen might hope to make an impact. 
 Chapter 2 shows how and why the term  civic engagement quickly rose 
to prominence, illustrating the term’s meteoric rise and the confusion that 
accompanies its widespread use. Civic engagement has remained popular, 
infl uential, and ultimately misleading for a number of reasons. The sec-
ond half of the term, engagement, is one of those reasons.  Engage entails 
a combination of activity and attention, an investment of energy and a 
consciousness of purpose. At some level that has registered with the pub-
lic; during the very same years of civic engagement’s meteoric rise, public 
discourse showed an accelerated concern with attention, distraction, and 
the diffi culties of engaging with the pace of modern life. 
 But not all engagement is political, although the term  civic engagement 
lumps league bowling together with town hall meetings. Nor is politi-
cal engagement necessarily moral; consider the Ku Klux Klan or other 
violent hate groups. Thus chapter 2 distinguishes among political, social, 
and moral engagement—distinctions usually elided in civic engagement 
scholarship—and sketches examples of each type. It further differenti-
ates among engagement undertaken at the local, national, and interna-
tional level, each of which entails unique challenges, commitments, and 
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 67 For similar distinctions between intrinsic and instrumental goods, see Parfi t (1997: 
203–21). See as well Aristotle’s  Nichomachean Ethics (1985: 1096b15). Additionally, Da-
vid Miller (1995: 194) distinguishes between liberals and “nationalists” according to their 
instrumental and intrinsic valuation of politics, respectively. 
 68 On the point of Arendt’s acknowledged debt to Tocqueville, see Lloyd (1995) and 
Benhabib (1990). 
 69 Tocqueville (1969: 12). 
 70 Arendt (1959: 5). 
 71 Tocqueville (1969: 20). 
 72 Neither Arendt nor Tocqueville uses the term  political engagement , but both are con-
cerned with active, attentive involvement in community and political affairs. 
rewards. I consider the somewhat striking and unpopular possibility that 
liberal democracies may require social and a certain kind of moral en-
gagement (stressing toleration, reciprocity, and law-abidingness) more or 
less continuously, but political engagement only episodically. 
 That claim brings up the question of whether political engagement is 
really as valuable as most of us seem to think. Advocates of political 
engagement either take its worth for granted or make one of two kinds 
of claims on its behalf. They assert that political engagement is an instru-
mental good for citizens of representative democracies or an intrinsic 
good for human beings. 67 Intrinsic arguments differ from instrumental 
arguments in that the former praise political life not for what it can elicit 
but because of what it is. Political participation, in the intrinsic view, is 
excellent or strongly choice worthy simply for what it represents, and it 
carries a dignity all its own. 
 Chapters 3 and 4 turn to Hannah Arendt and Alexis de Tocqueville 
for representative versions of the intrinsic and instrumental defenses of 
political engagement, respectively; these two views still strongly infl u-
ence contemporary debates. Tocqueville and Arendt share an intellectual 
link—Arendt acknowledges a debt to Tocqueville’s work—and a com-
mon focus. 68 Both are anxious friends of democracy who worry that 
withdrawal from public life, whether voluntary or involuntary, may un-
dermine the foundations of democratic freedom. At the beginning of  De-
mocracy in America Tocqueville promises to address the question, “where 
. . . are we going?” 69 At the beginning of  The Human Condition Arendt 
proposes to “think what we are doing.” 70 Both Tocqueville and Arendt 
hope to improve their readers’ vision or, as Tocqueville puts it, to help 
readers “see not differently but further.” 71 They offer long-term perspec-
tive to citizens who can be too closely immersed in day-to-day activities 
to realize that their choices may jeopardize their interests. 
 Both Arendt and Tocqueville associate political engagement 72 with a 
motivating force or dynamism that inheres in all individuals but fi nds 
its fullest expression when exercised in concert. Tocqueville calls both 
the individual and the collective capacity by the single name, “energy” 
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 73 Maurizio Passerin d’Entrèves (1993: 2) writes, “Arendt’s conception of politics, with 
its stress on civic engagement and unconstrained political deliberation, is clearly indebted 
to [classical civic republicanism],” and certain strains of modern-day civic republicanism in 
turn owe a debt to Arendt. 
 Participatory civic republicanism, sometimes termed  civic humanism and tracing a lin-
eage to ancient Athens, comprises the strain of modern civic republicanism associated with 
Arendt. But other forms of civic republicanism, such as the  institutional version—which 
traces its lineage to ancient Rome and is espoused by contemporary theorists such as Philip 
Pettit and Quentin Skinner—do not stress participation as an intrinsic good and have no 
particular affi nity with Arendt. For more on the participatory and institutional strains of 
republicanism, see Berger (2010). 
( énergie ). Arendt calls the individual capacity “action” and the collec-
tive phenomenon “power.” For Arendt and Tocqueville, the societal en-
vironment—institutional arrangements as well as political, social, and 
moral norms—strongly infl uences whether energy or power will fl ourish 
or fade. Tocqueville goes one step further, focusing on citizens’ atten-
tion as well as their energy. A close reading shows that in Tocqueville’s 
eyes, political energy fades when citizens’ political attention wanders, 
which in democratic societies will probably be the norm. (That claim 
might not in itself seem revolutionary, but previous scholarship has not 
emphasized the vital link between attention and energy in Tocqueville’s 
thought, and the possible means of countering their dissipation.) For 
Arendt and Tocqueville, the problem of sustaining political engagement 
might be conceptualized as the problem of generating political energy 
or power. 
 Arendt, one of the twentieth century’s most infl uential philosophers, 
is often cited by those who promote the participatory democratic theo-
ries sometimes known as civic humanism, civic republicanism, or com-
munitarianism because she champions political engagement for its own 
sake and lauds the dignity and joy of spontaneous, unfettered political 
action. 73 But Arendt’s arguments exemplify the diffi culties of defending 
political engagement for its intrinsic merits. I will propose a new reading 
of her work suggesting that her praise of political engagement and action 
should be interpreted as intentional overstatement. If interpreted liter-
ally it either lapses into internal contradiction or else into elitism, neither 
of which seem likely from a thinker of Arendt’s stature and egalitarian 
commitments. Arendt is ultimately more successful at expanding our un-
derstanding of the evils that we must avoid at all costs, which include 
political, social, and moral disengagement, than at teaching us about the 
goods that we must pursue together. 
 In recent years Tocqueville’s star has burned even more brightly than 
Arendt’s. A great number of books and articles in the civic engagement 
literature cite Tocqueville approvingly to illustrate how citizens can 
learn about democracy through engagement with local associations and 
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 74 Among political scientists, Putnam, Skocpol, and Fiorina all cite Tocqueville in in-
troducing their works on civic engagement. The  American Prospect chose the name “The 
Tocqueville Files” for its multipart, multiauthor debate on civic engagement. In the po-
litical theory compilation  Freedom of Association (1998), Amy Gutmann, George Kateb, 
Sam Fleischacker, Daniel A. Bell, Alan Ryan, Nancy Rosenblum, and Yael Tamir all cite 
Tocqueville to contextualize their claims about the importance of association in liberal 
democracies. Gutmann and Tamir, in fact, open their essays with quotes from Tocqueville’s 
 Democracy in America . 
 75 See Berman (1997). 
 76 This point might surprise Tocqueville dilettantes but not specialists such as Craiutu and 
Jennings (2004) and Villa (2008). 
government and then steer society meaningfully. 74 But too often schol-
ars celebrate him for the wrong reasons. Many of them cite the same 
few passages from Tocqueville’s voluminous works and pass over the 
many observations that contradict their assumptions. Even the recent 
term, neo-Tocquevillean—occasionally used as an epithet to character-
ize scholars who overvalue civic engagement as the sole or primary in-
gredient for making democracy work—refl ects an imperfect grasp of his 
teachings and insights, demeaning Tocqueville along with the alleged 
neo- Tocquevilleans. 75 To be sure, Tocqueville stresses the importance of 
voluntary associations and political participation, but he also stresses 
the need for institutional design that can channel citizens’ collective en-
ergy into useful political outlets and connect local energy with regional 
and national politics. Further, political scientists commonly misinterpret 
Tocqueville as an optimistic champion of American democracy, ignor-
ing his suspicions that Jacksonian America’s high political engagement 
could not endure. 76 This book provides insights into the ways in which 
Tocqueville and Arendt should, and should not, be drawn upon when we 
theorize about democracy in America and elsewhere. 
 For all of their similarities Arendt and Tocqueville ultimately value po-
litical engagement for different reasons. Arendt defends participation in 
public life as an intrinsic good, one of the most valuable experiences of 
human existence, the essence of human freedom, and an end in itself. 
Tocqueville values political engagement instrumentally, doubting that it 
directly constitutes the good life for most people. In truth, each thinker 
shares ground with the other. Arendt understands politics’ instrumental 
benefi ts and Tocqueville grasps that exceptional individuals might cher-
ish political life for its own sake. But Tocqueville alone stresses political 
engagement’s instrumental value as the primary reason why democracy 
cannot do without at least some of it, and Tocqueville alone implies prac-
tical prescriptions for regenerating some of that value even as the world 
changes in ways that threaten social and political engagement. After min-
ing Arendt’s and Tocqueville’s work for underappreciated insights into 
our relationship with political, social, and moral engagement, chapter 
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 77 Schumpeter (1942); Somin (1998). 
 78 Meyers (2008: 191–93). 
 79 In chapter 3 and 4 I describe some of the harms that can accompany radical disengagement. 
Regarding those groups most likely to be harmed by political disengagement, Verba, Schlozman, 
and Brady (1995: 178) demonstrate a robust correlation between income and education levels, 
on one hand, and political engagement on the other. They also demonstrate the presence of “par-
ticipatory distortion.” Distortion refers to “the circumstance in which political activists do not 
refl ect accurately the larger population from which they come with respect to some politically 
relevant characteristic,” and it occurs much more signifi cantly among poor and poorly educated 
segments than the rest of the population. Those with fewer economic and educational resources 
are less likely to engage politically and more likely to be misrepresented when disengaged. Bartels 
(2009) and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) also provide extensive data on the disproportionate 
participation and representation of white, wealthy, and well-educated citizens. 
4 fi nds Tocqueville’s instrumental defense of political engagement more 
persuasive. 
 None of the scholars who defend widespread political engagement, 
including Tocqueville, makes a fully convincing case that democracy al-
ways  (or even usually) requires such engagement from all or most of its 
citizens, all or most of the time. Chapter 5 catalogs the most prominent 
arguments for political engagement’s importance and shows that each, in-
dividually, presents circumstantial evidence: suggestive and perhaps plau-
sible but ultimately inconclusive. But in political theory as in courtroom 
trials, circumstantial evidence can prove decisive if compiled in quantity 
and assembled coherently. From the available evidence I build a case for 
political engagement’s importance that can stand up to critical scrutiny 
where others, individually, fall short. The case suggests that political en-
gagement is likely to bring at least some of a wide range of benefi ts to 
at least some of liberal democracy’s citizens at least some of the time. 
Thus we cannot be indifferent to political engagement, as some theorists 
of “elite” democracy hold. 77 But neither can we regard it as the grand 
solution to what ails us. 78 Liberal democracy cannot do without politi-
cal engagement but does not necessarily need high and widespread levels 
either. In fact, in the area of political engagement liberal democracies’ top 
priority should be preventing radical  dis engagement , which threatens a 
variety of undesirable consequences, and also to promote political atten-
tion and activity among those segments of the population most likely to 
suffer when disengaged. 79 
 That proposal accords with my general approach to democratic re-
form. We are hard-pressed to establish the exact conditions required for 
liberal democracy’s health, but we can discern those conditions that will 
almost certainly undermine it. They include not only radical political dis-
engagement but also balkanized social engagement, very low levels of 
liberal- democratic moral engagement, and weak or unresponsive political 
institutions. Before embarking on potentially coercive and paternalistic 
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campaigns to increase political engagement nationwide, liberal democra-
cies should promote a number of conditions that are not yet well estab-
lished. Specifi cally, they should take care to ensure responsive political 
institutions, generalized social engagement, generalized liberal-democratic 
moral engagement, episodic political engagement, and what we might call 
political attention monitors—nongovernmental, independent actors and 
institutions (including partisan watchdog organizations, newspapers, tele-
vision shows, weblogs, and community activists) that pay attention to po-
litical developments and can attract citizens’ attention (and mobilize their 
energy) when exceptional circumstances demand it. 
 Chapter 6 closes with some modest proposals intended not to cure 
democracy’s attention defi cit but to keep its worst effects enduringly in 
check. As mentioned above democratic citizens can elect to alter their 
tastes through political education and habituation; can change the tenor 
of political discussions, debates, and media coverage so that politics ap-
peal more effectively to existing tastes; and can alter political institutions 
so that they utilize and channel existing political attention and energy 
more effi caciously. I am least sanguine about the fi rst option and most 
sanguine about the third, but the second is of special interest because—as 
I will explain in chapter 4—it follows from Tocqueville’s teachings yet is 
almost totally ignored in today’s political engagement scholarship. 
 In addition to prescriptions directed at all citizens equally, checking 
the worst effects of democracy’s political attention defi cit means focusing 
on certain groups’ disengagement more than others. Promoting political 
engagement among the upper middle class or among college students at 
elite institutions—who already tend to participate at much higher rates 
than the rest of the population—is unlikely to improve democratic repre-
sentation, fairness, or legitimacy commensurate with its cost. The poorest 
and least educated citizens are most likely to be disengaged both politi-
cally and socially and least likely to be accurately represented by politi-
cians or activists. 80 Engaging these marginalized citizens would improve 
their prospects and serve the broader polity as well by promoting the 
widely shared goals of fairness and democratic legitimacy. 81 By the same 
token promoting political engagement at the local rather than national 
level speaks to a broad range of democratic values and goals and can 
pave the way for national-level engagement. 82 
 The preceding issues affect not only political theorists but also a broad 
range of citizens, so this book addresses multiple constituencies. To po-
litical scientists it promises that clarifying our discourse and specifying 
our terms can improve the study of democratic politics. By  distinguishing 
 80 Verba et al. (1995: 463–508). Also see Strolovitch (2007) .
 81 Lijphart (1997: 1). 
 82 Cf. Fung (2006); Sirianni and Friedland (2001); Sabl (2002b). 
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 83 To be sure, many political theorists take a close account of empirical evidence regard-
ing political participation. Cf. Thompson (1970); Pateman (1970); Mansbridge (1999); 
Fung (2006). But many more do not, especially regarding attention and tastes. 
 84 Democratic theorists seldom cite studies chronicling American citizens’ dislike for po-
litical engagement, such as Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) or suggesting that “people 
whose political networks involve greater political disagreement are less likely to participate 
in politics. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002: 183–208). See also Mutz (2002 and 2006). 
among political, social, and moral engagement, which do not always co-
incide, it encourages political scientists to specify the attentive activities 
most essential for democratic societies rather than lumping them all into 
one “civic” category. By highlighting attention and energy as the funda-
mental concerns shared by almost all scholars using the infelicitous term 
 civic engagement , it encourages future studies to consider means of at-
tracting, sustaining, and harnessing those resources more effectively. This 
book also encourages political scientists to extend their study of limited 
attention’s political implications beyond the realm of periodic voting. 
Limited attention can affect all forms of political engagement and can 
affect social and moral engagement as well, all of which matter greatly in 
projecting democracy’s success. 
 To political theorists this book recommends a more earnest engage-
ment with the empirical evidence of human beings’ limited attention and 
of citizens’ tastes, values, and choices regarding political and political 
participation. 83 Tocqueville shows us the way with his “new political sci-
ence,” dictating philosophical inquiry based on empirical observations. 
But some political theorists overlook the evidence of our limited politi-
cal attention and participatory ambivalence, projecting their own taste 
for political engagement onto the public. 84 Theorists must acknowledge 
contemporary empirical data and also the diagnoses of wandering po-
litical attention that recur throughout the philosophical canon, and they 
must grapple with the means of accepting, rejecting, or overcoming those 
 assessments. 
 To scholars in other academic fi elds—psychologists, sociologists, and 
any researchers interested in the capacities and limitations of attention, 
energy, and tastes—this book recommends an interdisciplinary dialogue 
that benefi ts from diverse expertise. Political scientists and theorists tend 
to focus on what I call  political engagement (even when we mistakenly 
call it  civic ); sociologists focus on what I call  social engagement ; social 
and cognitive psychologists focus on  moral engagement  and disengage-
ment . But we should be talking to one another instead of working by 
ourselves. 
 We should be talking to ordinary citizens as well. This book gives an 
account of political engagement, social engagement, and moral engage-
ment—their meaning, value, and challenges—in which we citizens can 
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 85 “What Is Enlightenment?” in  Kant: Political Writings  (1991: 55). For Kant the “entire 
reading public” meant a much smaller group than it does now, so in a sense my aims are 
even more democratic. 
recognize ourselves and our experiences. The public philosophy of atten-
tion defi cit democracy is currently on the tips of our tongues, capable of 
invigorating public debate once articulated. Because it speaks to widely 
held commitments, values, and doubts, it complements rather than sup-
plants top-down theories such as civic republicanism and deliberative de-
mocracy. Any public philosophy that prescribes worthy but controversial 
changes in our policies and practices, such as deliberation guided only by 
neutral reason or greatly increased political participation, should try to 
persuade the public to its point of view by engaging citizens on their own 
terms, respecting their current values, tastes, and goals. 
 This book’s commitment to addressing a broad audience follows from 
Immanuel Kant’s insistence that scholars employ their reason before “the 
entire reading public.” 85 Citizens are the core element of democratic poli-
tics, so political theorists who take democratic politics seriously must 
take citizens seriously as well. When we citizens begin to understand why 
political engagement is esteemed yet frequently deserted we can begin to 
consider realistic solutions. I present attention defi cit democracy not as a 
cynical last word on our plight but as the beginning of a hopeful public 
conversation. 
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